Some Speculations about Semicompatibilism
Some Speculations about Semicompatibilism
Meghan Griffith
ABSTRACT
At the very outset of his excellent Our Fate, John Martin Fischer suggests that arguments for the incompatibility of freedom to do otherwise and divine foreknowledge “are in important ways parallel to a more recent (“Modern”) argument for the incompatibility of causal determinism and freedom to do otherwise” (1). Comparisons between foreknowledge and determinism appear throughout the book, typically when Fischer is defending incompatibilist arguments regarding foreknowledge and freedom to do otherwise (i.e., alternatives). But in an intriguing discussion in the introductory chapter, Fischer draws a comparison between determinism and foreknowledge with respect to moral responsibility, arguing that, like determinism, foreknowledge is compatible with our having it. Thus, he offers a parallel to one of his landmark views, namely his semicompatibilism about determinism. Fischer defines semicompatibilism about determinism as “the doctrine that moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism, even if causal determinism rules out freedom to do otherwise” (49). In Our Fate, he suggests that moral responsibility is compatible with foreknowledge, even if foreknowledge rules out this kind of freedom.
To share on other social networks, click on any share button. What are these?
December 2017
Vol. 4, Sp. Iss. 2 Pages 1-101
